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1 Introduction
What is exploitation? In political philosophy, the most general definition af-
firms that agent A exploits agent B if and only if A takes unfair advantage of
B. Despite its intuitive appeal, this definition leaves two major issues in need
of a precise specification, namely the source of the unfairness and the struc-
ture of the relationship between A and B that allows A to take advantage of
B. There is considerable debate in the economic and philosophical literature
concerning both issues. Although both aspects of exploitative relations are
arguably crucial (see Veneziani, 2008; Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2009; and
Yoshihara, 2010, for a thorough defense of this claim), the analytical focus of
this paper is on the unfairness, or more precisely, on the economic inequalities
involved in the concept of exploitation.
To be specific, this paper analyses the Marxian theory of exploitation as
an unequal exchange (hereafter, UE) of labour, according to which exploita-
tive relations are characterised by a difference between the amount of labour
that an individual provides and the amount of labour contained in some rel-
evant bundle that she does (or can) purchase with her income. There are
at least two reasons to focus on labour as the measure of the injustice of
exploitative relations. First, in a number of crucial economic interactions,
the notion of exploitation is inextricably linked with some form of labour
exchange. Second, the UE definition of exploitation captures some inequal-
ities in the distribution of material well-being and free hours that are - at
least prima facie - of normative relevance. For instance, they are relevant
for inequalities of well-being freedom, as discussed by Rawls (1971) and Sen
(1985, 1985a),1 because material well-being and free hours are two crucial
determinants of individual well-being freedom. Further, it can be proved
that in a private-ownership economy with positive profits, class and UE ex-
ploitation status are strictly related, and they accurately reflect an unequal
1The notion of well-being freedom emphasises an individual’s ability to pursue the life
she values. In the Rawls-Sen theory, inequalities in the distribution of well-being freedom
are formulated as inequalities of capabilities, whereas they are formulated as inequalities of
(comprehensive) resources in Dworkin’s theory (Dworkin, 2000). The resource allocation
problem in terms of equality of capability is analysed in Gotoh and Yoshihara (2003),
whereas Roemer (1986) and Yoshihara (2003) analyse it in terms of equality of resources.
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distribution of assets (as formalised in the Class-Exploitation Correspondence
Principle; see Roemer, 1982). That is, in equilibrium the wealthy emerge as
exploiters and members of the capitalist class, whereas the poor are exploited
and members of the working class. From this perspective, exploitative rela-
tions are relevant because they reflect unequal opportunities of life options,
due to differential ownerhsip of productive assets.
Although the definition of UE exploitation is seemingly intuitive, it has
proved surprisingly difficult to provide a fully satisfactory general theory of
exploitation. In fact, outside of standard Leontief economies, the appropriate
definition of the amount of labour ‘received’ by an agent is not obvious, and
indeed a number of approaches have been proposed (see Yoshihara, 2010).
Further, outside of stylised, linear two-class economies, the core insights of
exploitation theory do not necessarily hold. A key tenet of the standard
Marxist theory, for example, concerns the relation between profits and ex-
ploitation: profits represent the way in which capitalists appropriate social
surplus and social labour. This has been incorporated into the Fundamental
Marxian Theorem (hereafter, FMT) which states that exploitation is syn-
onymous with positive profits. The relevance of FMT is such that although
it is proved as a result, its epistemological status is that of a postulate: the
appropriate definition of exploitation is considered to be one which preserves
FMT. Various definitions of exploitation have been proposed precisely in an
attempt to generalise FMT to economies with joint production, heteroge-
nous labour, and so on (see Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1981; Krause, 1982.
For recent debates, see Veneziani, 2004; Flaschel 2010). Yet in more gen-
eral economies, a number of counterexamples have been found and no fully
satisfactory definition that preserves FMT has been provided so far.
In this paper, exploitation is analysed in general economies with a convex
production technology and with maximising agents endowed with heteroge-
neous preferences and with different amounts of both physical and human
capital, as outlined in section 2. The economies analysed are thus signifi-
cantly more general than those usually considered in exploitation theory.2
One substantive contribution of this paper is to provide a definition of ex-
ploitation, which extends some of the core insights of exploitation theory,
such as the FMT, and allows one to characterise the exploitation status of
all agents in such general economies. This definition focuses on the aggre-
2An interesting analysis of nonconvexities in Marxian economic theory can be found in
Negishi (1998). The latter paper does not focus on exploitation, though.
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gate amount of social labour performed and on its distribution to agents
via market mechanisms, and it is conceptually related to the ‘New Inter-
pretation’ (Dume´nil, 1980; Foley, 1982; Dume´nil and Foley, 2008; Dume´nil,
Foley, and Le´vy, 2009). Unlike the main received approaches, this definition
is firmly anchored to the actual data of the economy and it has an inherently
social dimension, because it takes the aggregate allocation of the economy
as the starting point. Further, it defines exploitation as a feature of the
(competitive) allocation of social labour rather than the result of productive
inefficiencies, or imperfections in the labour market. Thus, in addition to
preserving FMT in general economies, it captures some key features of the
Marxian theory of exploitation, and has a clear empirical content.
Methodologically, this paper extends the axiomatic analysis of UE ex-
ploitation developed by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) and Yoshihara (2010).
This novel approach to exploitation theory provides a general framework to
compare the most important definitions in the literature. An axiomatic ap-
proach was long overdue in exploitation theory, where the proposal of alter-
native definitions has sometimes appeared as a painful process of adjustment
of the theory to anomalies and counterexamples. The definitions of exploita-
tion thus constructed have progressively lost the intuitive appeal, normative
relevance, and even connection with the actual, observed variables emerging
from a competitive mechanism. By adopting an axiomatic approach, this
paper suggests to start from first principles, thus explicitly discussing the
intuitions behind exploitation theory.
To be precise, in section 3, an axiom is introduced, called Labour Ex-
ploitation for the Working Class (hereafter, LEW), which restricts the way
in which the set of exploited agents is identified. This axiom is interpreted
as the minimal necessary condition to capture the core intuitions of exploita-
tion theory, and it is shown that all of the main definitions of exploitation
in the literature satisfy it (see Morishima, 1974; Foley, 1982; Roemer, 1982.
See also Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2009; and Yoshihara, 2010). Then, the
epistemological role of FMT as a postulate in Marxian exploitation theory is
explicitly recognised and FMT is stated in axiomatic terms as requiring that,
in equilibrium of a convex economy, propertyless agents be exploited if and
only if profits are positive. Theorem 1 provides the first rigorous characteri-
sation of the class of definitions satisfying LEW which preserve FMT. Based
on this characterisation, it is shown that, among all the main definitions, the
‘New Interpretation’ is the only one that preserves FMT.
Theorem 1 is an important result for two reasons. Methodologically, it
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provides the first general axiomatic analysis of the relation between exploita-
tion and profits, and a starting point for further research in general convex
economies with heterogeneous agents. Substantively, given the theoretical
relevance of FMT in exploitation theory, Theorem 1 provides strong support
for the ‘New Interpretation’ as the appropriate formulation of UE exploita-
tion. Thus, it confirms and extends the analysis of Yoshihara and Veneziani
(2009), who have shown that in the class of convex subsistence economies -
which may be taken as a subset of the economies analysed in this paper -
the ‘New Interpretation’ is uniquely characterised by a small number of weak
axioms capturing the key insights of UE exploitation.
Two extensions of the analysis are also presented, which provide further
support for the ‘New Interpretation.’ First, a focus on the poorest segment
of the working class, namely agents without any physical assets, is appro-
priate from the axiomatic viewpoint: focusing on a strict subset of the set
of agents makes the axiomatic framework rather weak. Yet one may argue
that this is reductive and some key characteristics of advanced capitalist
economies should be explicitly considered, which make the issue of Marxist
exploitation a contentious one today - such as the fact that many workers
do own some non-labour assets, and even stock in firms, through their pen-
sion funds. Second, although FMT is traditionally analysed by focusing on
equilibrium allocations (see Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1981), this perspec-
tive might be deemed too narrow. In the context of exploitation theory, one
may question general equilibrium-type constructions as representations of al-
location and distribution in market economies because they depend on the
often tacit assumption of equal-treatment, or equivalently, that transactions
take place only at equilibrium prices.3 In a general theory of exploitation, it
would therefore be important to take account of transactions at disequilib-
rium prices and the resulting horizontal inequity in distribution endogenous
to market allocation. In section 4 the generality of the model is exploited to
show that the ‘New Interpretation’ can be extended, first, to analyse the ex-
ploitation status of all agents, in economies with heterogeneous preferences,
physical assets, and skills (Theorem 2), and then to establish a relation be-
tween exploitation and profits outside of equilibrium allocations (Theorem
3).
It is important to note at the outset that exploitation theory is not sim-
3This issue has been brought to our attention by Duncan Foley in a private exchange.
For an analysis of the implications of trading at disequilibrium prices, see Foley (2010).
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ply about proving FMT. Yet the relation between profits and exploitation is
crucial and it plays a prominent role in the literature (in addition to the con-
tributions already mentioned, see the recent works by Mori, 2008; Flaschel,
2010; Fujimoto and Opocher, 2010). Further, the ‘New Interpretation’ pro-
vides the foundations for a general theoretical framework, which can deal
with many unresolved issues in exploitation theory, including the analysis of
unequal exchange and international relations. (See Veneziani and Yoshihara,
2009. For a critique of the standard Marxist analysis, see Negishi, 1999.)
Some extensions of the analysis are briefly discussed in section 5 below.
Finally, the existence of a general equilibrium is proved in Appendix 1.
This proof completes the analysis by showing the consistency of the eco-
nomic framework, but it is also interesting per se because both the structure
of Marxian economies and the equilibrium concept adopted are different from
the standard Walrasian framework. Indeed, Appendix 1 generalises the ex-
istence results derived by Roemer (1981).
2 The Model
An economy consists of N agents. Let R+ be the set of nonnegative real
numbers. Production technology is freely available to all agents, who can
operate any activity in the production set P , which has elements of the form
α = (−αl,−α, α) where αl ∈ R+ is the effective labour input of the process;
α ∈ Rn+ are the inputs of the produced goods used in the process; and
α ∈ Rn+ are the outputs of the n goods. Thus, elements of P are vectors in
R2n+1. The net output vector arising from α is denoted as α̂ ≡ α − α. P
is assumed to be a closed convex cone containing the origin in R2n+1. Let
0 = (0, ..., 0)′. The following assumptions on P hold throughout the paper.4
Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P , if α ≥ 0 then αl > 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ Rn+ , there is a α ∈ P such that α̂ = c.
Assumption 3 (A3). For all α ∈ P , and for all (−α′, α′) ∈ Rn− × Rn+ , if
(−α′, α′) 5 (−α, α) then (−αl,−α′, α′) ∈ P .
A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative output
vector. A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as
4For all vectors x, y ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . , n); x ≥ y if and only
if x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , n).
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a net output. A3 is a free disposal condition, which states that, given any
feasible production process α, any vector producing (weakly) less net output
than α is also feasible using the same amount of labour as α itself.
Given P , the set of production activities feasible with αl = k units of
effective labour can be defined as follows:
P (αl = k) ≡ {(−αl,−α, α) ∈ P | αl = k} ,
and the set of net output vectors feasible with k units of effective labour is:
P̂ (αl = k) ≡ {α̂ ∈ Rn | there is α ∈ P (αl = k) such that α− α = α̂} .
For any set X ⊆ Rn, ∂X ≡ {x ∈ X | @x′ ∈ X s.t. x′ > x} is the frontier of
X, and SX ≡ {x ∈ X | @x′ ∈ X s.t. x′ ≥ x} is the efficient frontier of X.
This paper investigates exploitation when heterogeneous agents are en-
dowed with unequal amounts of physical and human capital. In the economy,
agents produce, consume, and trade labour. On the production side, they
can either sell their labour-power or hire workers to work on their capital,
or they can be self-employed and work on their own assets. More precisely,
for all ν ∈ N , let sν ∈ R++ be agent ν’s skill level and let ων ∈ Rn+ be the
vector of productive assets inherited by ν. Then, αν = (−ανl ,−αν , αν ) ∈ P
is the production process operated by ν as a self-employed producer, with
her own capital, where ανl = s
νaνl and a
ν
l is the labour time expended by ν;
βν =
(
−βνl ,−βν , β
ν
)
∈ P is the production process that ν operates by hir-
ing (effective) labour βνl ; γ
ν = sν lν is ν’s effective labour supply, where lν is
the labour time supplied by ν on the market. Thus, let λν = (aνl + l
ν ) be the
total amount of labour time expended by ν, and let Λν = ανl + γ
ν = sνλν be
the total amount of effective labour performed by ν, either as a self-employed
producer or working for some other agent.
On the consumption side, let C ⊆ Rn+ be the consumption space of each
agent with generic element cν as a consumption vector of agent ν, and assume
that total labour hours expended by each agent do not exceed the common
endowment Lν , where units are normalised so that Lν = 1, for all ν. Agent
ν’s welfare is representable by a function uν : C × [0, 1] → R+ , which is
monotonic on C × [0, 1] (increasing in consumption and decreasing in labour
time). The function u can be interpreted either as a standard subjectivist
neoclassical utility function or as an objectivist index of individual well-
being, or status. The latter view is more in line with exploitation theory, but
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the two interpretations are formally equivalent.5 For the sake of simplicity,
and with no loss of generality, in what follows, u is assumed to be strictly
monotonic on C in at least one argument. The conclusions of the paper do
not depend on this assumption, and some extensions of the analysis and the
relation with other models in the literature are discussed in section 5 below.
Let p denote the 1× n vector of commodity prices and let w denote the
wage rate per unit of effective labour. Given the assumption of perfect con-
tracting in the labour market, the latter is indeed the relevant wage. Given
(p, w), each ν is assumed to choose a plan (αν , βν , γν , cν ) to maximise her
welfare subject to the constraint that net income is sufficient for consump-
tion plans; wealth is sufficient for production plans; production plans are
technically feasible; and total labour hours expended do not exceed Lν = 1.
Formally, each ν solves the following programme MP ν .6
max
(αν ,βν ,γν ,cν )
uν (cν , λν )
subject to
[p (αν − αν )] +
[
p
(
β
ν − βν
)
− wβνl
]
+ [wγν ] = pcν ,
p
(
αν + βν
)
5 pων ,
αν ∈ P ; βν ∈ P , λν 5 1.
MP ν is a suitable way of modelling agent ν’s decision problem. On the
one hand, it can be interpreted as a generalisation of standard Marxian
accumulation economies (see, e.g., Roemer 1981, 1982; Yoshihara, 2010),
in which heterogeneous individuals are explicitly considered in their double
role as producers and consumers. In Yoshihara (2010), for example, s =
(1, . . . , 1), C ≡ Rn+ , and there is a continuous, quasi-concave, and strictly
monotonic real-valued function f : C → R+ such that uν (c, λ) = f (c), for all
ν and for any (c, λ) ∈ C×[0, 1]. Further, as shown below, although agents are
not assumed to maximise profits, profit maximisation is a corollary of MP ν .
On the other hand, individuals are not assumed to be simply ‘agents of
capital’ and unlike in traditional Marxian models (e.g., Roemer, 1982, ch.4),
5For a discussion of subjective and objective approaches, see Roemer and Veneziani
(2004) and, in the context of Marxist theory, Yoshihara and Veneziani (2010).
6The first constraint is written as equality without loss of generality, given the assump-
tions on the monotonicity of u.
8
capitalists are not assumed to maximise accumulation per se and production
does not take place “for production’s own sake” (Luxemburg, 1951, p.333).
Let Oν (p, w) be the set of plans (αν , βν , γν , cν ) that solve MP ν at prices
(p, w). Let Ω =
(
ω1 , ω2 , ..., ωN
)
, u =
(
u1 , u2 , ..., uN
)
, and s =
(
s1 , s2 , ..., sN
)
.
Let E(P,N,u, s,Ω), or as a shorthand notation E, denote the economy with
technology P , agents N , utility functions u, labour skills s, and productive
endowments Ω. Let the set of all such economies be denoted by E . Let
c =
∑N
ν=1 c
ν be aggregate consumption; and let a similar notation hold for
all other variables. The equilibrium concept can now be defined.
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(P,N,u, s,Ω) ∈ E is a price
vector (p, w) and an associated set of actions such that:
(i) (αν , βν , γν , cν ) ∈ Oν (p, w) for all ν (optimality);
(ii) α̂+ β̂ = c (reproducibility);
(iii) α+ β 5 ω (feasibility);
(iv) βl = γ (labour market equilibrium).
In other words, at a RS (i) every agent optimises; (iii) there are enough
resources for production plans; and (iv) the labour market clears. Condition
(ii) states that net outputs should at least suffice for aggregate consumption.
This is equivalent to requiring that the vector of social endowments does not
decrease component-wise, because (ii) is equivalent to ω+
(
α̂ + β̂ − c
)
= ω,
which states that stocks at the beginning of next period should not be smaller
than stocks at the beginning of the current period. Indeed, although the RS is
defined as a temporary equilibrium in a static general equilibrium framework,
it can be seen as a one-shot slice of a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework.7
Some properties of RSs should immediately be noted. First, by the as-
sumptions on u, it immediately follows that p ≥ 0 and w = 0 at a non-trivial
RS. Next, let pimax = maxα∈P
pα̂−wαl
pα
: by the assumptions on P , pimax is well-
defined. Hence, let P pi(p, w) =
{
α ∈ P | pimax = pα̂−wαl
pα
}
. It is proven in
a straightforward way at any non-trivial RS, that the maximum profit rate
is nonnegative, that only processes yielding the maximum rate of profit are
activated, and that the profit rate is equalised.
7See Veneziani (2007) and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2009) for a thorough analysis.
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Lemma 1: Let (p, w) be a non-trivial RS for E ∈ E such that c ≥ 0. Then,
pα̂− wαl = 0 for some α ∈ P\ {0}, and αν , βν ∈ P pi(p, w) for all ν.
3 Labour exploitation: an axiomatic approach
In Marxian theory, exploitation is conceived of as the unequal exchange of
labour between agents: considering an agent ν ∈ N , exploitative relations are
characterised by systematic differences between the labour contributed by ν
to the economy and the labour ‘received’ by ν, which is given by the amount
of labour contained, or embodied, in some relevant consumption bundle(s).
Therefore, for any bundle c ∈ Rn+, it is necessary to define the labour value (or
labour content) of c. Unlike in standard Leontief economies, the definition
of the labour content of c is not obvious, and various definitions have, in
fact, been proposed. In this section, a general condition - called the axiom
of Labour Exploitation for the Working Class, or LEW - is proposed which
every definition of labour exploitation should satisfy in order to capture the
core insights of the theory of exploitation as the UE of labour.
First of all, note that the set of agents N can be partitioned, for analytical
purposes, into two disjoint subsets, namely the core of the working class, de-
noted as W , which comprises agents with no initial endowments; and the set
O of agents, including some segments of the working class, who own a posi-
tive amount of at least some productive assets. Thus,W = {ν ∈ N | ων = 0}
and O = {ν ∈ N | ων ≥ 0}. The economies analysed in this paper are more
general than the polarised, two-class societies usually considered in the liter-
ature, and in the next section the exploitation status of all agents is derived,
including those in intermediate class positions. Yet the set of proletarians W
is of clear focal interest in exploitation theory: theoretically, if any agents
are exploited, then those inW should be definitely among them, if they work
at all. It is therefore opportune, from a formal viewpoint, to focus on the set
W in order to provide a domain condition defining a minimum requirement
that all definitions of exploitation as the UE of labour should satisfy.8
8It might be argued that the appropriate definition of proletarians relates to their
financial wealth, rather than their vector of endowments. If this view is adopted, then
W ′ = {ν ∈ N | pων = 0} and O′ = {ν ∈ N | pων > 0}. This distinction is relevant only if
p ≯ 0 and it does not make any significant difference for the results of this paper. In fact,
since axiom LEW aims to provide a weak domain condition to define the set of exploited
agents, it is theoretically appropriate to focus on the set of agents W ⊆W ′.
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Let B (p, wΛ) ≡ {c ∈ Rn+ | pc = wΛ} denote the set of consumption bun-
dles that can be (just) afforded, at prices p, by an agent in W , who supplies
Λ units of labour at a wage rate w. Let φ (c) ≡ {α ∈ P | α̂ = c} denote the
set of activities that produce at least c as net output. A basic axiom can now
be introduced that every formulation of labour exploitation should satisfy.
Labour Exploitation for the Working Class (LEW): Consider any
economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a RS for E. Given any definition of exploita-
tion, the set of exploited agentsN ted ⊆ N is identified at (p, w). Then, the set
N ted should have the following property: there exists a profile (c1, ..., cW ) such
that for any ν ∈ W , cν ∈ B (p, wΛν ) ∩ Rn+ , and for some αcν ∈ φ (cν ) ∩ ∂P
with α̂c
ν ≯ cν :
ν ∈ N ted ⇔ αcνl < Λν .
Axiom LEW requires that, at any RS, the exploitation status of every
propertyless worker ν ∈ W be characterised by identifying a nonnegative
reference commodity vector cν . This reference vector is technically feasible
and can be purchased by ν, and it identifies the amount of labour that ν
receives. Thus, if ν ∈ W supplies Λν , and Λν is more than the labour
socially necessary to produce cν , then ν is regarded as contributing more
labour than ν receives. According to LEW, all such agents belong to N ted.9
As a domain condition for the admissible class of exploitation-forms,
LEW captures some key insights of the UE theory of exploitation that are
shared by all of the main approaches in the literature.10 In the UE theory,
the exploitation status of an agent ν is determined by the difference between
the amount of labour that ν ‘contributes’ to the economy, in some relevant
sense, and the amount she ‘receives’, in some relevant sense. In the con-
vex economies considered in this paper, the former quantity is given by the
amount of labour supplied, Λν , whereas there are many possible UE views
concerning the amount of labour that each agent receives, which incorporate
different normative and positive concerns. As a domain condition, LEW
9In axiom LEW the case N ted = N is not ruled out: this is theoretically appropriate,
given the nature of LEW as a minimum domain condition, and even some of the classic
definitions of exploitation - such as Morishima’s (1974) - do not exclude this case.
10It should be stressed that LEW only applies to labour-based definitions of exploita-
tion. It is not relevant, for example, for Roemer’s (1982) property-relations definition of
exploitation. Similar versions of LEW are analysed by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009)
and Yoshihara (2010), in the context of different economies.
11
provides some minimal, key restrictions on the definition of the amount of
labour that a theoretically relevant subset of agents receives.
First, according to LEW, the amount of labour that ν ∈ W receives
depends on her income, or more precisely, it is determined in equilibrium by
some reference consumption vectors that ν can purchase. In the standard
approach, the reference vector corresponds to the bundle actually chosen by
the agent. LEW is weaker in that it only requires that the reference vector
be potentially affordable.
Second, LEW captures another key tenet of the UE theory of exploitation
by stipulating that the amount of labour associated with the reference bundle
- and thus ‘received’ by an agent - is related to the production conditions
of the economy. More precisely, LEW states that the reference bundle be
technologically feasible as net output, and it defines its labour content as the
amount of labour socially necessary to produce it. It is worth noting that
LEW requires that the amount of labour associated with each reference
bundle be uniquely determined with reference to production conditions, but
it does not specify how such amount should be chosen, and there may be in
principle many (efficient) ways of producing cν , and thus of determining αc
ν
l .
Third, LEW is weak also because it does not provide comprehensive
conditions for the determination of exploitation status. It only focuses on a
subset of agents, namely those who own no physical assets, and it is silent
on the exploitation status of all other agents. Further, given any definition
of exploitation, and any RS, the set of exploiters N ter ⊆ N is also defined,
where N ter ∩ N ted = ∅, but axiom LEW imposes no restrictions on the
determination of N ter.
Finally, it is worth noting that the vector cν in LEW need not be uniquely
fixed, and may be a function of (p, w). Further, once cν is identified, the
existence of αc
ν
is guaranteed by A2 and A3.
In sum, LEW incorporates several key features of exploitation as the UE
of labour, and it sets a weak restriction on the class of admissible definitions.
Indeed, that all of the main definitions in the literature, suitably extended
to economies with heterogeneous labour, satisfy LEW. Consider first Mor-
ishima’s (1974) classic definition. According to Morishima, the labour value
of a commodity vector c, denoted as l.v. (c), is the minimum amount of (ef-
fective) labour necessary to produce c as net output. Formally:
l.v. (c) ≡ min {αl | α = (−αl,−α, α) ∈ φ (c)} .
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It is easy to see that φ (c) is non-empty by A2 and that the set
{αl | α = (−αl;−α;α) ∈ φ (c)}
is bounded from below by 0, by the assumption 0 ∈ P and by A1. Hence,
l.v. (c) is well defined and, by A1, it is positive whenever c 6= 0. Then, the
following definition of exploitation can be provided.
Definition 2 (Morishima, 1974): A worker ν ∈ W , who supplies Λν and
consumes cν ∈ Rn+ , is exploited, i.e. ν ∈ N ted, if and only if Λν > l.v. (cν ).
In order to show that Definition 2 satisfies LEW, at any RS, let cν ≡ cν ∈
B (p, wΛν ) and:
αc
ν ∈ argmin {αl | α = (−αl,−α, α) ∈ φ (cν )} .
Unlike Morishima’s (1974) definition, Roemer’s (1982) definition of labour
value depends on prices. Given a price vector (p, w), let φ (c; p, w) ≡ {α ∈ P pi(p, w) | α̂ = c}
be the set of profit-rate-maximising activities that produce at least c as net
output. According to Roemer (1982), the labour value of vector c, denoted
as l.v. (c; p, w), is the minimum amount of (effective) labour necessary to
produce c as net output among profit-rate-maximising activities. Formally:
l.v. (c; p, w) ≡ min {αl | α = (−αl,−α, α) ∈ φ (c; p, w)} .
Again, it is immediately verified that l.v. (c; p, w) is well defined and it is
positive for all c 6= 0. Then the following definition can be stated.
Definition 3 (Roemer, 1982): Consider an economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a
RS for E. A worker ν ∈ W , who supplies Λν and consumes cν , is exploited,
i.e. ν ∈ N ted, if and only if Λν > l.v. (cν ; p, w).
In order to show that Definition 3 satisfies LEW, at any RS, let cν ≡ cν ∈
B (p, wΛν ) and
αc
ν ∈ argmin {αl | α = (−αl,−α, α) ∈ φ (cν ; p, w)} .
In addition to the above two classic definitions, in this paper, a new
definition is analysed, which has been recently proposed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani (2009, 2010) and Yoshihara (2010). For any p ∈ Rn+ and c ∈ Rn+,
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let B (p, c) ≡ {x ∈ Rn+ | px = pc}: B (p, c) is the set of bundles that cost
exactly as much as c at prices p.
Definition 4: Consider an economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a RS for E such
that α̂p,w is aggregate net output and αp,wl is aggregate (effective) labour
expended. Let τ c ∈ [0, 1] be such that τ cα̂p,w ∈ B (p, c). The labour embodied
in c at the social reproduction point αp,w is τ cαp,wl .
As in Roemer’s (1982) approach, in Definition 4 the labour content of a
commodity can be identified only if the price vector is known. Yet social
relations play a more central role than in Roemer’s theory, because the defi-
nition of labour content requires a prior knowledge of the social reproduction
point and labour content is explicitly linked to the redistribution of total
social labour (total labour employed), which corresponds to the total labour
value of national income. Then, the following definition identifies the set of
propertyless workers who are exploited.
Definition 5: Consider an economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a RS for E such
that α̂p,w is the social reproduction point. For any ν ∈ W , who supplies
Λν and consumes cν , let τ c
ν
be defined as in Definition 4. Then, ν ∈ W is
exploited, i.e. ν ∈ N ted, if and only if Λν > τ cναp,wl .
Definition 5 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ developed by
Dume´nil (1980) and Foley (1982). In fact, for any ν ∈ W , τ cν represents ν’s
share of national income, and so τ c
ν
αp,wl represents the share of social labour
which ν receives by earning income barely sufficient to buy pcν . Then, as in
the New Interpretation, the notion of exploitation is related to the production
and distribution of national income and social labour.
In order to show that Definition 5 satisfies LEW, given any (p, w) such
that αp,w is the social production point, let τ c
ν
= pc
ν
pα̂p,w
, cν ≡ τ cν · α̂p,w ∈
B (p, wΛν ) and αc
ν ≡ τ cναp,w.
The previous arguments provide strong support to the idea that LEW
does represent an appropriate domain condition in exploitation theory. LEW
is formally weak and it incorporates some arguably compelling and widely
shared views on exploitation as the UE of labour. Thus, although it can be
proved that the axiom is not trivial and not all definitions in the literature
14
satisfy it,11 all of the major approaches do.12 The next question, then, is how
to discriminate among the various definitions satisfying LEW.
A key tenet of the standard Marxist approach concerns the relation be-
tween profits and exploitation. This has been incorporated into FMT (see,
e.g., Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1981), according to which exploitation is syn-
onymous with positive profits. The relevance of FMT, especially in standard
approaches, is such that although it is proved as a result, its epistemologi-
cal status is that of a postulate: the appropriate definition of exploitation
is considered to be one which preserves FMT. Therefore it is theoretically
appropriate to formalise FMT explicitly in axiomatic terms.
FMT: Given an economy E ∈ E and a RS for E, (p, w), with aggregate
production activity αp,w, it holds that:[
pα̂p,w − wαp,wl > 0⇔ N ted ⊇ W+
]
where W+ ≡ {ν ∈ W : Λν > 0}.
A number of points are worth noting about FMT. First, the axiom is
formulated without specifying any definition of labour exploitation: whatever
the definition adopted, propertyless agents should be exploited if and only
if profits are positive in equilibrium. Second, FMT is more general than in
standard two-class models. This is because it both applies to advanced capi-
talist economies with a complex class structure, and allows for the possibility
that propertyless workers in W+ are a strict subset of the set of exploited
agents, that is W+ ⊂ N ted. Note that the axiom focuses only on propertyless
workers who perform at least some labour: this is a theoretically appropri-
ate restriction, since the exploitation status of agents who do not engage
in any economic activities is unclear. Finally, unlike in standard models,
FMT is general also in the sense that it allows for very general assumptions
on agents and technology, including heterogeneous preferences and skills, a
convex cone technology, and so on. Thus, axiom FMT encompasses the
standard formulations as special cases.
11For example, it can be proved that the subjectivist notion of labour exploitation based
on workers’ preferences recently proposed by Matsuo (2008) does not satisfy LEW. For a
thorough discussion, see Yoshihara and Veneziani (2010).
12It is worth noting that based on Flaschel’s (1983) definition of additive labor values, it is
possible to derive another formulation of labor exploitation that satisfies LEW. Similarly,
Definition 6 in Yoshihara (2010) also satisfies LEW.
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Let B++ (p, wΛ) ≡
{
c ∈ Rn+ | pc > wΛ
}
: B++ (p, wΛ) is the set of con-
sumption bundles that an agent in W supplying Λ units of effective labour
cannot afford. Let Γ (p, w; k) ≡
{
α̂ ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = k) ∩ Rn+ | α̂ ∈ B++ (p, wk)
}
:
Γ (p, w; k) is the set of net outputs that can be produced efficiently using k
units of (effective) labour, which cannot be afforded by propertyless agents
supplying k units of effective labour. The next theorem characterises the class
of definitions of exploitation that satisfy LEW and such that FMT holds.
Recall that if LEW holds, then for any ν ∈ W , there is a cν ∈ B (p, wΛν )
and αc
ν ∈ φ (cν ) ∩ ∂P with α̂cν ≯ cν such that ν ∈ N ted ⇔ αcνl < Λν .
Theorem 1: For any definition of labour exploitation satisfying LEW, the
following two statements are equivalent for any E ∈ E and for any RS (p, w)
with associated aggregate production activity αp,w:
(1) FMT holds under this definition;
(2) for each ν ∈ W+,
[
there exists cν ∈ Γ (p, w; Λν ) ∪
{
Λν
αp,wl
α̂p,w
}
such that cν > α̂c
ν
]
⇔ pimax > 0.
Proof: (2)⇒(1): Consider any E ∈ E and any RS (p, w) with αp,w. Suppose
that, for each ν ∈W+,
[
there exists cν ∈ Γ (p, w; Λν ) ∪
{
Λν
αp,wl
α̂p,w
}
such that cν > α̂c
ν
]
⇔
pimax > 0.
Let pimax > 0, so that by Lemma 1, pα̂p,w − wαp,wl > 0. Note that, for
any ν ∈ W+, if cν = Λναp,wl α̂
p,w then cν ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = Λν ). Then, for all ν ∈ W+,
since cν ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = Λν ) and cν > α̂cν , and noting that αcν ∈ φ (cν )∩ ∂P , we
have αc
ν
l < Λ
ν . Thus, by LEW, ν ∈ N ted holds for any ν ∈W+.
Let pimax = 0, so that by Lemma 1, pα̂p,w − wαp,wl = 0. First, note that
by A2, pimax = 0 implies w > 0. Next, for each ν ∈ W+, if pimax = 0, then
∂P̂ (αl = Λ
ν ) ∩ Rn+ ⊆ B− (p, wΛν ) ≡
{
c ∈ Rn+ | pc 5 wΛν
}
, which implies
that Γ (p, w; Λν ) = ∅. Thus, (2) implies that for each ν ∈ W+, for cν =
Λν
αp,wl
α̂p,w, cν > α̂c
ν
does not hold. Then, cν = Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w and cν ∈ B (p, wΛν )
imply that for any αc
ν ∈ φ (cν ) with α̂cν ≯ cν , αcνl = Λν . Thus, by LEW,
ν /∈ N ted holds for any ν ∈ W+.
In sum, (2) implies that FMT holds under any definition of exploitation
satisfying LEW.
(1)⇒(2): Consider any E ∈ E and any RS (p, w) with αp,w. Suppose that
pα̂p,w − wαp,wl > 0 ⇔ N ted ⊇ W+. First of all, note that if either W = ∅ or
Λν = 0 for all ν ∈ W , then condition (2) is vacuously satisfied. Therefore
suppose that Λν > 0 for at least some ν ∈ W , and W 6= ∅.
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Let pα̂p,w − wαp,wl > 0, so that pimax > 0. By LEW and FMT, for
each ν ∈ W+, there exist cν ∈ Rn+ and αcν ∈ φ (cν ) ∩ ∂P with αcν ≯ cν
such that pcν = wΛν and αc
ν
l < Λ
ν . Then, for all ν ∈ W+, let δν >
1 be such that δναc
ν
l = Λ
ν . For each ν ∈ W+, let us first consider the
case that α̂c
ν
> 0. Then, let cν ≡ δν α̂cν . Clearly cν ∈ Γ (p, w; Λν ) and
cν > α̂c
ν
. Secondly, let us consider the case that α̂c
ν ≯ 0. Note that,
because of A2, ∂P̂ (αl = Λ
ν )∩Rn++ 6= ∅ holds. Since δν α̂cν ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = Λν )∩
Rn+, the convexity of P̂ (αl = Λν ) guarantees that any convex combination
of δν α̂c
ν
and any points in ∂P̂ (αl = Λ
ν ) ∩ Rn++ is feasible, and any point
derived from this convex combination belongs to P̂ (αl = Λ
ν ) ∩ Rn++, even
if such a point is very close to δν α̂c
ν
. Thus, for any open neighbourhood
V of δν α̂cν , V ∩ P̂ (αl = Λν ) ∩ Rn++ 6= ∅. Thus, for some sufficiently small
neighbourhood V∗ of δν α̂cν , there is xν ∈ V∗ ∩ P̂ (αl = Λν ) ∩ Rn++ which is
sufficiently close to δν α̂c
ν
and xν > α̂c
ν
holds. Then, there is ² = 1 such
that ²xν ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = Λν ) ∩ Rn++. Take cν ≡ ²xν . Suppose w > 0. Then
δν α̂c
ν ∈ B++ (p, wΛν ), and cν ∈ B++ (p, wΛν ) follows from the fact that cν is
sufficiently close to δν α̂c
ν
and B++ (p, wΛ
ν ) is open. Thus, cν ∈ Γ (p, w; Λν )
and cν > α̂c
ν
. Suppose w = 0. If pα̂c
ν
> 0, the result follows in a similar
manner. If pα̂c
ν
= 0, the result follows from the fact that cν ∈ Rn++, noting
that pimax > 0 implies p ≥ 0.
Let pα̂p,w − wαp,wl = 0, so that by Lemma 1, pimax = 0. By LEW and
FMT, for some ν ∈ W+, there exist cν ∈ Rn+ and αcν ∈ φ (cν ) ∩ ∂P with
αc
ν ≯ cν such that pcν = wΛν and αcνl = Λν . Actually, the latter property
must hold for all ν ∈ W+. For suppose, to the contrary, that for some
ν ∈ W+, there exist cν ∈ Rn+ and αcν ∈ φ (cν ) ∩ ∂P with αcν ≯ cν such that
pcν = wΛν and αc
ν
l < Λ
ν . Then this implies pα̂c
ν = pcν = wΛν > wαcνl ,
which violates the assumption that pimax = 0. Thus, for any ν ∈ W+, there
exist cν ∈ Rn+ and αcν ∈ φ (cν ) ∩ ∂P with αcν ≯ cν such that pcν = wΛν
and αc
ν
l = Λν . Then, for each ν ∈ W+, let cν = Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w, since Γ (p, w; Λν ) is
empty when pimax = 0. Since pcν = wΛν = pcν , it follows that cνi ≯ α̂c
ν
i for
at least some i with α̂c
ν
i > 0. Note that by A2, pi
max = 0 implies that w > 0.
In sum, if FMT holds, then (2) holds under any definition of exploitation
satisfying LEW.¥
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows. FMT states that propertyless
workers are exploited if and only if equilibrium profits are positive. Accord-
ing to LEW, the exploitation status of propertyless workers is determined
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by identifying a set of reference bundles (call them the exploitation-reference
bundles). By Theorem 1, in every convex economy, FMT holds if and only
if the existence of positive profits in equilibrium is also determined by iden-
tifying a set of reference bundles (call them the profit-reference bundles).
According to LEW, the exploitation-reference bundles must be affordable
by the workers and must be producible with less than Λν units of labour for
all exploited workers. According to condition (2), instead, for all workers
ν ∈ W+, the profit-reference bundles must be producible with a technically
efficient process using Λν units of labour, and must be such that they are
not affordable by ν and dominate the exploitation-reference vector if and
only if the maximum profit rate is positive. The relevance of Theorem 1,
then, is not only in the identification of a general condition for the validity
of the relation between exploitation and profits. Methodologically, Theorem
1 suggests that different views about exploitation, and the analysis of the
key features of exploitation theory, should focus on the identification of the
relevant reference bundles.
Theorem 1 does not identify a unique definition of exploitation that meets
axiom FMT, but rather a class of definitions satisfying condition (2). Yet
Theorem 1 has surprising implications concerning the main received ap-
proaches in exploitation theory. For there are economies in which no point
in Γ (p, w; Λν) ∪
{
Λν
αp,wl
α̂p,w
}
satisfies condition (2), if α̂c
ν
is given either by
Definition 2 or by Definition 3. In contrast, it can be proved that Definition
5 satisfies condition (2), and thus FMT holds in general convex economies
with heterogeneous agents.13
Corollary 1: There exists an economy E ∈ E and a RS (p, w) with as-
sociated aggregate production point αp,w such that neither Definition 2 nor
Definition 3 satisfy FMT. Instead, Definition 5 satisfies FMT for all E ∈ E
and all RS (p, w).
Proof: For the proof that neither Definition 2 nor Definition 3 satisfy
FMT, see Appendix 2. We need to prove that Definition 5 satisfies condition
(2) of Theorem 1. We consider two cases for any E ∈ E and any RS (p, w).
Case 1: α̂p,w > 0 or α̂p,w = 0. By setting cν = Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w for all ν ∈ W+, it
is immediately seen that Definition 5 satisfies condition (2).
13An example similar to those analysed in Appendix 2 below is used in Yoshihara (2010;
Corollary 2) to prove that the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (Roemer, 1982)
does not hold under Definition 3.
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Case 2: α̂p,w ≥ 0 and α̂p,w ≯ 0. Firstly, let this RS (p, w) be associated
to pimax = 0. Then, only cν = Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w is available for all ν ∈ W+, since
Γ (p, w; Λν ) = ∅ as shown in the proof of Theorem 1. Then, it is immediately
seen that Definition 5 does not meet cν > α̂c
ν
. Secondly, let this RS (p, w) be
associated to pimax > 0. Then, for each ν ∈ W+, Λναp,wl α̂
p,w ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = Λν ) ∩
∂Rn+. Thus, using the same argument as in Theorem 1, it can be shown that
there is ²xν ∈ ∂P̂ (αl = Λν )∩Rn++ for each ν ∈W+, which is sufficiently close
to Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w. Let cν ≡ ²xν for each ν ∈W+. Since Λναp,wl α̂
p,w ∈ B++ (p, wΛν ) by
p Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w −wΛν = Λν
αp,wl
(pα̂p,w − wαp,wl ) > 0, cν ∈ B++ (p, wΛν ) follows from
the fact that cν is sufficiently close to Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w and B++ (p, wΛ
ν ) is open.
Thus, cν ∈ Γ (p, w; Λν ). Noting τ cν = pcν
pα̂p,w
= wΛ
ν
wαp,wl
wαp,wl
pα̂p,w
= Λ
ν
αp,wl
wαp,wl
pα̂p,w
and
wαp,wl
pα̂p,w
< 1 by pimax > 0, it follows that τ c
ν
< Λ
ν
αp,wl
. Thus, τ c
ν
α̂p,w < Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w
holds, so that τ c
ν
α̂p,w < cν since cν is sufficiently close to Λ
ν
αp,wl
α̂p,w. Finally,
since α̂c
ν
= τ c
ν
α̂p,w under Definition 5, α̂c
ν
< cν holds for each ν ∈ W+.
In summary, condition (2) of Theorem 1 holds for any RS (p, w). ¥
4 Exploitation and Profits: Two extensions
Given the theoretical relevance of FMT in the Marxian theory of exploita-
tion, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 provide strong support for Definition 5 as
the appropriate notion of UE exploitation. In this section, two extensions
of the analysis are presented, which provide further support to the ‘New
Interpretation’. The generality of the model is exploited to show that Defini-
tion 5 can be extended to analyse, first, the exploitation status of all agents
and then the relation between exploitation and profits outside of equilib-
rium allocations, in economies with heterogeneous preferences and unequal
endowments of physical and human capital. This suggests that, if the ‘New
Interpretation’ is adopted, then exploitation theory can be extended to yield
interesting insights on advanced capitalist economies. As a first step, Defini-
tion 5 is generalised to identify the exploitation status of all agents.
Definition 6: Consider any economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a RS for E
with aggregate production activity αp,w. For any ν ∈ N , who supplies Λν
and consumes cν ∈ Rn+ , let τ cν be defined as in Definition 4. Agent ν is:
exploited if and only if Λν > τ c
ν
αp,wl ; an exploiter if and only if Λ
ν < τ c
ν
αp,wl ;
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and neither exploited nor an exploiter if and only if Λν = τ c
ν
αp,wl .
Theorem 2 proves that, based on Definition 6, it is possible to characterise
the exploitation status of all agents - and not only of the poorest segments of
the working class - and to derive a more general relation between profits and
exploitation, extending FMT beyond the set of propertyless agents. Recall
that N ted is the set of exploited agents and N ter is the set of exploiters.
Theorem 2: Consider an economy E ∈ E. Let (p, w) be a RS for E with
associated aggregate production activity αp,w. Under Definition 6 :
(1) if pimax > 0, agent ν is: exploited if and only if pω
ν
pω
< Λ
ν
αp,wl
; neither
exploited nor an exploiter if and only if pω
ν
pω
= Λ
ν
αp,wl
; and an exploiter if and
only if pω
ν
pω
> Λ
ν
αp,wl
.
(2) if pimax > 0, then
{
ν ∈ N | pω
αp,wl
< pω
ν
sν
}
⊆ N ter. Furthermore, if there
is a subsistence bundle b ∈ Rn+ such that cν = b, for all ν ∈ N , then{
ν ∈ N | pων
pω
< pb
pα̂p,w
}
⊆ N ted.
(3) if pimax = 0, N ted = N ter = ∅.
Proof: Part 1. Let (p, w) be a RS for E ∈ E . Then by Definition
1-(i), it follows that pα̂ν +
[
pβ̂ν − wβνl
]
+ wγν = pcν for all ν ∈ N . Since
p
(
αν + βν
)
= pων , for all ν ∈ N , and noting that only processes yielding the
maximum rate of profit are going to be activated, the latter expression can
be written as pimaxpων+wΛν = pcν . Then, by Definition 1-(ii) and Definition
1-(iv), it follows that pimaxpω + wαp,wl = pα̂
p,w. Therefore Λν = τ c
ν
αp,wl if
and only if Λν = pi
maxpων+wΛν
pimaxpω+wαp,wl
αp,wl , which yields the desired result. The other
two inequalities are proved similarly.
Part 2. Let (p, w) be a RS for E ∈ E . The first part of the statement
follows immediately from part 1, noting that λν 5 1. In order to prove the
second part of the statement, note that by Definition 1-(i), it follows that
pα̂ν +
[
pβ̂ν − wβνl
]
+ wγν = pcν for all ν ∈ N . Since p (αν + βν) = pων ,
for all ν ∈ N , and noting that only processes yielding the maximum rate
of profit are going to be activated, the latter expression can be written as
pimaxpων + wΛν = pcν . Therefore it follows that Λν > τ c
ν
αp,wl if and only
if
[
pcν−pimaxpων
w
]
> pc
ν
pα̂p,w
αp,wl , which is in turn equivalent to pc
ν
[
1− wα
p,w
l
pα̂p,w
]
>
pimaxpων . Then, setting cν = b, for all ν ∈ N , gives the desired result.
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Part 3. If pimax = 0, then it follows that wΛν = pcν , for all ν ∈ N , and
wαp,wl
pα̂p,w
= 1, which yields the desired result. ¥
Theorem 2-(1) completely characterises the exploitation structure of an
economy in equilibrium: an agent is exploited (respectively, an exploiter) if
and only if her share of social wealth is lower (respectively, higher) than her
share of social labour. Theorem 2-(2) shows that at the two extremes of the
wealth distribution, exploitation status can be determined independently of
individual choices, an intuition of standard Marxist theory that is proved to
be robust. Indeed, if a subsistence bundle exists, the set of agents that are
exploited regardless of their individual choices will be larger than the set of
propertyless agents (those who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’). This
set can be sizable if b is not interpreted as a physical subsistence bundle, but
rather as reflecting moral and social elements. Jointly with Theorem 2-(3),
this result generalises FMT to a larger set of agents than the propertyless
segment of the working class.
Theorem 2 completes the analysis of the relation between exploitation
and profits in equilibrium and it extends the main insights of UE exploita-
tion theory to all agents in the general economies considered in this paper,
under Definition 6. This is crucial given the focal theoretical interest in equi-
librium allocations, but one may argue that a robust theory of exploitation
should provide insights also on out-of-equilibrium allocations. In the rest of
this section, an extension of Definition 5 is proposed, and a general relation
between exploitation and profits is derived, at any feasible allocation.
The key point to note is that there are various possible ways of conceptu-
alising exploitation at general disequilibrium allocations and, consequently,
there is no trivial way of extending Definition 5. For example, outside of a
RS, it is unclear whether exploitation status should be determined relative
to the actual features of the allocation. On the one hand, if individual plans
are not realised, coordination failures arise, and perhaps even sheer mistakes
are made, then by focusing on actual data one may be capturing only purely
transient and ephemeral phenomena that do not tell much about the struc-
tural features of the economy. On the other hand, one may insist that, even
outside of an RS, only the information contained in the actual allocation
point is relevant to analyse exploitation. For, ultimately, the actual features
of the allocation are what matters to the agents.
In the extension of Definition 5 to disequilibrium allocations proposed
here, the actual features of the allocation, including the actual price vector,
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the aggregate production activity, and the individual work and consumption
choices of all agents remain central in the definition of the labour content of
a bundle of commodities and the exploitation status of propertyless agents.
However, the effects of sheer individual mistakes in technical choices, or of
purely temporary market imbalances leading to productive inefficiency are
discounted. To be precise, given a price vector (p, w) and an associated
aggregate production activity αp,w ∈ P , define
φ (c;αp,w) ≡
{
α′ ∈ P | ∃t, µ ∈ R+ : (α′l, α̂′) = (tαp,wl , tµα̂p,w) , µα̂p,w ∈ P̂ (αl = αp,wl ) & α̂′ = c
}
φ (c;αp,w) denotes the set of production activities which are along the ray
defined by (αp,wl , α̂
p,w) and produce at least c as net output. Then:
l.v. (c;αp,w) ≡ min {αl | α = (−αl,−α, α) ∈ φ (c;αp,w)} .
Clearly, l.v. (c;αp,w) is well-defined and bounded below by 0. The labour
content of a bundle c at any given allocation can be defined as follows.
Definition 7: Consider an economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a price vector for
E with associated aggregate production activity αp,w. Let τ c ∈ [0, 1] be such
that τ cα̂p,w ∈ B (p, c). The labour embodied in c at the social reproduction
point αp,w is l.v. (τ cα̂p,w;αp,w).
The following definition identifies the set of propertyless workers who are
exploited at any given allocation.
Definition 8: Consider an economy E ∈ E . Let (p, w) be a price vector for
E such that αp,w is the associated production point. For any ν ∈ W , who
supplies Λν and consumes cν , let τ c
ν
be defined as in Definition 7. Then,
ν ∈ W is exploited, i.e. ν ∈ N ted, if and only if Λν > l.v. (τ cν α̂p,w;αp,w).
From a formal viewpoint, Definitions 7 and 8 generalise Definitions 4 and
5 and they reduce to the latter at a RS. In fact, if (p, w) is a RS for E,
then αp,w ∈ ∂P and l.v. (τ cα̂p,w;αp,w) = τ cαp,wl holds. From a theoretical
viewpoint, in Definitions 7 and 8, the actual allocation of the economy plays
a pivotal role. In order to define labour content and the exploitation status of
propertyless agents, the actual price vector and the actual individual choices
on work and consumption are central. The only possible deviation from
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actual data concerns the focus on technically efficient production activities
in the definition of labour content, but the set of admissible efficient activities
used in Definitions 7 and 8 is significantly constrained by the actual social
production point αp,w (unlike in Roemer’s or Morishima’s definitions).
The focus on efficient aggregate production vectors is theoretically rea-
sonable. For technically inefficient activities in the interior of the production
possibilities set are the product of transient contingencies and do not reveal
much about the structural features of the economy.14 Moreover, note that,
given the nature of LEW as a domain condition, in section 3 a weak for-
mulation of the axiom is adopted by restricting its application to RS’s. It
is straightforward, however, to extend LEW to all price vectors (p, w) with
associated social production point αp,w and, from a theoretical viewpoint,
none of the arguments used to defend LEW in section 3 depends on the as-
sumption that the allocation is an equilibrium. Therefore one may argue that
LEW remains an appropriate domain condition to define UE exploitation
even at disequilibrium allocations. From this perspective, it is worth noting
that Definition 8 satisfies LEW, at any (p, w) with associated social produc-
tion point αp,w. To see this, let τ c
ν
= pc
ν
pα̂p,w
, cν ≡ τ cν · α̂p,w ∈ B (p, wΛν ) and
αc
ν ≡ argmin {αl | α = (−αl,−α, α) ∈ φ (cν ;αp,w)}.
Let CW =
∑
ν∈W c
ν and ΛW =
∑
ν∈W Λ
ν . Based on Definition 8, Theo-
rem 3 establishes a general relation between exploitation and profits for any
general convex cone economies and at any feasible allocations.
Theorem 3: For any economy E ∈ E , any (p, w) ∈ Rn+1+ and any allocation
(αν , βν , γν , cν )ν∈N with pc
ν = p
(
α̂ν + β̂ν
)
− w (βνl − γν ) (∀ν ∈ N), the
following statements are equivalent for any α∗ ∈ ∂P (αl = ΛW ) with α̂∗ ∈
∂P̂
(
αl = Λ
W
) ∩ Rn+:
(1) pα̂∗ − wα∗l > 0 holds;
(2) for any ν ∈ W+, Λν > l.v.
(
τ c
ν
α̂∗;α∗
)
, where l.v.
(
τ c
ν
α̂∗;α∗
)
= τ c
ν
α∗l for
τ c
ν ∈ [0, 1) with τ cν α̂∗ ∈ B (p, cν ).
Proof: Taking a point α̂∗ from ∂P̂
(
αl = Λ
W
)∩Rn+. Let α∗ ∈ ∂P (αl = ΛW )
be a production point corresponding to α̂∗.
14Indeed, Marx’s own notion of Socially Necessary Labour Time may be interpreted as
ruling out inefficient technologies and involving a counterfactual analysis. See Sen (1978)
for a discussion.
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Suppose (1) holds. Then, pα̂∗ − wΛW = p (α̂∗ − CW ) > 0, since the
budget constraint holds for all agents. Note that, for any ν ∈ W+, pcν =
wΛν = wΛW Λ
ν
ΛW
= pCW Λ
ν
ΛW
, thus pc
ν
pCW
= Λ
ν
ΛW
. Then, let τ c
ν
= pc
ν
pα̂∗ for any
ν ∈ W+. Clearly τ cν ∈ [0, 1) with τ cν α̂∗ ∈ B (p, cν ). Moreover, for any
ν ∈ W+, τ cνα∗l = pc
ν
pα̂∗Λ
W = pc
ν
pCW
pCW
pα̂∗ Λ
W = Λ
ν
ΛW
pCW
pα̂∗ Λ
W = Λν pC
W
pα̂∗ < Λ
ν ,
where the latter inequality follows from p
(
α̂∗ − CW ) > 0. Finally, since
α∗ ∈ ∂P (αl = ΛW ), l.v. (τ cν α̂∗;α∗) = τ cνα∗l holds. Thus, (2) is obtained.
Suppose (2) holds. Then, for any ν ∈ W+, Λν > l.v.
(
τ c
ν
α̂∗;α∗
)
, where
l.v.
(
τ c
ν
α̂∗;α∗
)
= τ c
ν
α∗l holds for τ
cν ∈ [0, 1) with τ cν α̂∗ ∈ B (p, cν ). Thus,
ΛW >
∑
ν∈W+ τ
cνα∗l holds. Since τ
cν = pc
ν
pα̂∗ for any ν ∈ W+, the last in-
equality implies that ΛW > pC
W
pα̂∗ Λ
W , thus p
(
α̂∗ − CW ) > 0 holds. Since
pCW = wΛW = wα∗l by the budget constraint, pα̂
∗ − wα∗l > 0 holds. ¥
Theorem 3 states that a general relation between exploitation and profits
holds, at any price vector and corresponding allocation, provided that pro-
ductive inefficiencies and temporary disequilibrium phenomena are ruled out:
at every technically efficient production vector α∗ (which is feasible using ac-
tual, effective labour ΛW =
∑
ν∈W Λ
ν ) society realises positive profits if and
only if every propertyless worker is exploited. In order to appreciate the full
generality of Theorem 3, it is important to stress that no significant restric-
tion is imposed on individual behaviour (except that the budget constraint
holds for all agents) and on the actual allocation. As a result, Theorem 3 does
not establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of positive
profits and the exploitation of propertyless workers at the actual allocation,
and the social production point αp,w may, or may not, coincide with one of
the vectors α∗. For given the extremely weak restrictions on the set of admis-
sible allocations, the link between profits and exploitation may be somewhat
weakened. For instance, if Λ
W
αl+βl
(
α̂ + β̂
)
∈ P̂ (αl = ΛW ) \∂P̂ (αl = ΛW )
and CW ∈ P̂ (αl = ΛW ) \∂P̂ (αl = ΛW ) hold at the actual allocation, then
the corresponding profit rate may be non-positive while propertyless agents
are exploited. However, Theorem 3 derives the general conditions under
which the economy can generate positive profits and propertyless workers are
exploited, starting from the actual individual consumption/leisure choices,
price system, and aggregate production actitivity. In other words, if one ab-
stracts from temporary disequilibrium phenomena, Theorem 3 does derive a
fully general relation between the appropriation of surplus by capitalists and
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the exploitation of (propertyless) workers, which holds even if exchanges do
not take place at equilibrium prices.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides a novel axiomatic analysis of the notion of exploitation as
the unequal exchange of labour focusing on the relation between exploitation
and profits. General convex economies with agents endowed with heteroge-
neous preferences and with different amounts of physical and human capital
are considered. First, an axiomatic characterisation of the class of definitions
that preserve the Fundamental Marxian Theorem (FMT) in equilibrium is
derived (Theorem 1). Based on this characterisation, it is shown that under
none of the main received definitions is the exploitation of the (propertyless
segment of the) working class synonymous with positive profits in general.
Instead, a definition related to the ‘New Interpretation’ is presented which
preserves the link between the appropriation of surplus and the exploitation
of (at least some) workers. This definition also allows one to generalise some
key insights of exploitation theory in complex convex economies with het-
erogeneous agents: it is possible to characterise the exploitation status of all
agents in equilibrium (Theorem 2) and to derive a general relation between
exploitation and profits even outside of equilibrium allocations (Theorem 3).
Given the relevance of FMT in exploitation theory, the results presented
in this paper provide strong support to the ‘New Interpretation’ as the ap-
propriate notion of exploitation in advanced capitalist economies. Thus,
they complement and strengthen the analysis developed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani (2009) in the context of convex subsistence economies. In fact,
as mentioned in section 2 above, the main results of the paper could be de-
rived by assuming the function uν to be weakly monotone on C × [0, 1] and
strictly monotone in at least one argument, provided some additional tech-
nical conditions to ensure local nonsatiation are added.15 This assumption
encompasses the special case where there is a subsistence bundle b ∈ Rn+
such that C ≡ {c ∈ Rn+ | c = b}, and uν (c, λ) = 1 − λ, for all ν and for
any (c, λ) ∈ C × [0, 1]. If u is given by a profile of functions of the latter
type and s = (1, . . . , 1), then E(P,N,u, s,Ω) is a subsistence economy of
15For example, if agents minimise labour over [0, 1], subject to a subsistence constraint,
then something like Roemer’s (1982) ‘Non Benevolent Capitalists’ assumption should be
made. For a thorough discussion, see Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009).
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the type analysed by Roemer (1982) and Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009).
But then, it is possible to conclude that the ‘New Interpretation’ provides
the unique appropriate definition of exploitation because, as shown above, it
preserves FMT in general, and, as shown by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009),
it is fully characterised by a small set of weak and intuitive axioms in the set
of subsistence economies which is a subset of the general class of economies
considered in this paper. Moreover, the set of axioms is satisfied by the ‘New
Interpretation’ definition of exploitation even in the general class of convex
economies discussed in this paper.
The results presented above, however, raise some interesting questions.
First of all, Theorem 2-(2) confirms the standard Marxist analysis of ex-
ploitation at the two ends of the wealth distribution: propertyless agents are
exploited and the very wealthy are exploiters. Yet, outside of the two ex-
tremes, the exploitation status of an agent is in general determined not only
by her endowment of physical capital, but also by her choice of consump-
tion and leisure, as well as her endowment of human capital - namely, her
skills. This raises some interesting issues for exploitation theory, in particu-
lar from a normative viewpoint: except for the agents at the two extremes
of the distribution of productive assets, it may well be the case that agents
with nonnegligible amounts of physical assets, who do not work much appear
as exploited because they have a large endowment of human capital, which
increases their overall labour contribution to the economy.
Second, this paper focuses on exploitation, and on the key relation be-
tween profits and exploitation. Another interesting issue concerns the rela-
tion between class and exploitation: Roemer (1982), for example, maintains
that the correspondence between class and exploitation status is a core in-
sight of Marxian exploitation theory. Definition 6 above might provide in-
teresting results on this issue, too. For example, Yoshihara and Veneziani
(2009) and Yoshihara (2010) prove that, unlike in the standard approaches,
if the New Interpretation is adopted, it is possible to derive the full class
and exploitation structure, and a robust correspondence between class and
exploitation status in convex economies with agents endowed with identical
preferences and skills. To extend the latter results to general economies with
heterogeneous agents is an interesting direction for further research.
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7 Appendix 1: The existence of a RS
This appendix proves the existence of an equilibrium for a theoretically rele-
vant subset of the set of economies E set out in section 2 above. It focuses on
the polar case where C = Rn+ and it generalises the proofs of existence in Roe-
mer (1981, 1982). Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) prove the existence of a
RS for another polar case of convex economies in which C =
{
c ∈ Rn+ | c = b
}
for some subsistence vector b ∈ Rn+\ {0}, uν is not strictly increasing on C,
and agents minimise labour.
It is assumed that uν is continuous, quasi-concave, and strictly increasing
on C for all ν ∈ N : these assumptions are standard in microeconomics and
need no further comment. Further, the following boundary condition of utility
functions is assumed, which is also standard in microeconomics: uν (c, λ) >
uν (0, λ′) for any c ∈ Rn+\ {0}, and any λ, λ′ ∈ [0, 1]. This assumption implies
that any propertyless agent ν ∈ W would rather participate in labour markets
to earn some revenue and purchase some consumption goods, than drop out
of labour markets consuming nothing. Thus, if some propertyless agents are
unemployed, they are involuntarily unemployed.
Finally, A1 is slightly strengthened to require that some produced inputs
be used in the production of commodities:
Assumption 1′ (A1′). For all α ∈ P such that αl ≥ 0 and α = 0, if
α ≥ 0 then αl > 0 and α ≥ 0.
A1′ is an essential property of a capitalist economy in the sense that if it is
not satisfied, anyone can in principle hire anyone else, including propertyless
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agents. Given the twin role of agents as consumers and producers, A1′ also
allows us to prove the boundedness of the aggregate demand correspondences.
Let a profile (cν , γν , βν )ν∈N be a feasible allocation for E ∈ E if and only if
(cν , γν , βν )ν∈N satisfies Definition 1-(ii), 1-(iii), and 1-(iv), and (c
ν , γν , βν ) ∈
C× [0, sν ]×P holds for all ν ∈ N . If the social endowment of capital ω of an
economy E ∈ E only allows for feasible allocations with∑ν∈N cν = 0, then if
a RS exists for this economy, it can only be a trivial RS. However, by A2, it
is always possible to have a non-trivial feasible allocation with
∑
ν∈N c
ν 6= 0
if ω is placed appropriately. Thus, in order to guarantee the existence of
non-trivial feasible allocations, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 4. The economy E(P,N,u, s,Ω) has the following property:
ω ∈
{
α ∈ Rn+ | ∃α ∈ P s.t. αl 5
∑
ν∈N
sν and α̂ ≥ 0
}
.
By A4, there exists α′ ∈ P with α′l 5
∑
ν∈N s
ν and α′ = ω such that for any
p > 0, p (α′ − ω) > 0. Thus, for a sufficiently small w′ > 0, p (α′ − ω)−wα′l =
0 holds for any w 5 w′. This implies that for any p > 0, there is w′ > 0 such
that for any w 5 w′, maxα∈P : pα=pω pα̂− wαl is non-negative.
For any vector (p, w), let Πν (p, w) ≡ pα̂ν +
[
pβ̂ν − wβνl
]
+ wγν de-
note agent ν ′s net revenue. Note that, for any (p, w), the set of optimal
solutions Oν (p, w) always contains vectors of the form (0, βν , γν , cν ) such
that Πν (p, w) = pimaxpβν + wγν = pcν with pβν = pων for all ν. Let
M≡ {(p, w) ∈ Rn+1+ |∑ni=1 pi + w = 1} and M+≡ {(p, w) ∈M| p > 0}.
In order to analyse the existence of a RS, for all (p, w) ∈M+, and for all
ν ∈ N , define the feasibility correspondence
Bν (p, w) ≡ {(cν , βν , γν ) ∈ C × P × [0, sν ] | pcν 5 Πν (p, w) ; pβν 5 pων} .
The next result establishes some basic properties of Bν (p, w).
Lemma A1.1: For each ν ∈ N , the correspondence Bν is non-empty,
closed-valued and convex-valued, and continuous on M+. Moreover, every
(cν , γν ) in Bν (p, w) is bounded for each (p, w) ∈M+.
Proof: It is obvious that Bν is non-empty, closed-valued, and convex-
valued. Since pcν 5 Πν (p, w) 5 max {pimaxpων , 0} + wsν , the boundedness
of (cν , γν ) in Bν (p, w) follows from A1′, for all (p, w) ∈M+.
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Finally, we prove the continuity of Bν . First, we show that Bν is lower
hemi-continuous. Let
{(
pk, wk
)} ⊆M+ be a sequence such that (pk, wk) →
(p, w) and (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Bν (p, w). For each (pk, wk), let βkν ≡ µkνβν where
µkν = 0 if
(
pkβ̂ν − wkβνl
)
< 0 and if
(
pkβ̂ν − wkβνl
)
= 0 then
µkν ≡
{
pkων
pων
if pkβν 5 pkων ,
pkων
pkβν
otherwise.
Then, let γkν = γν . Moreover, if cν 6= 0, then let σkν ≡ min
{
µkν (pkβ̂ν−wkβνl )+wkγkν
pkcν
, 1
}
and ckν ≡ σkν cν , whereas if cν = 0, then let ckν ≡ cν . Then, (ckν , βkν , γkν) ∈
Bν (pk, wk) with
(
ckν , βkν , γkν
)→ (cν , βν , γν ) as (pk, wk)→ (p, w). Thus, Bν
is lower hemi-continuous.
To prove that Bν is upper hemi-continuous, suppose that
{(
pk, wk
)} ⊆M+
is a sequence such that
(
pk, wk
) → (p, w) and (ckν , βkν , γkν) ∈ Bν (pk, wk)
with
(
ckν , βkν , γkν
) → (cν , βν , γν ) as (pk, wk) → (p, w), and (cν , βν , γν ) /∈
Bν (p, w). Then, either (cν , βν , γν ) /∈ C × P × [0, sν ], or pcν > Πν (p, w),
or pβν > pων . Since C × P × [0, sν ] is closed, (ckν , βkν , γkν) → (cν , βν , γν )
implies that (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ C × P × [0, sν ]. Thus, either pcν > Πν (p, w) or
pβν > pων . Suppose pβν > pων . Then, for some
(
pk, wk
)
close enough to
(p, w), its corresponding
(
ckν , βkν , γkν
)
is also sufficiently close to (cν , βν , γν ),
which implies pkβkν > pkων , which yields a contradiction. This implies that
(cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Bν (p, w). A similar argument holds if pcν > Πν (p, w) and
therefore Bν is upper hemi-continuous. ¥
Lemma A1.2 establishes some properties of optimal choice correspon-
dences.
Lemma A1.2: For each ν, the correspondence Oν is non-empty, closed-
valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M+. Moreover, every
(cν , γν ) in Oν (p, w) is bounded for each (p, w) ∈M+.
Proof: Non-emptiness, closed-valuedness, and convexity can be proved
in the standard manner. Since every (cν , γν ) in Bν (p, w) is bounded by
Lemma A1.1, every (cν , γν ) in Oν (p, w) is bounded for any (p, w) ∈M+.
We only need to show thatOν is upper hemi-continuous. Let {(pk, wk)} ⊆M+
be a sequence such that
(
pk, wk
) → (p, w) and (ckν , βkν , γkν) ∈ Oν (pk, wk)
with
(
ckν , βkν , γkν
)→ (cν , βν , γν ) as (pk, wk)→ (p, w). Suppose (cν , βν , γν ) /∈
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Oν (p, w). This implies that (cν , γν ) is not a maximizer of uν over Bν (p, w)
and (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Bν (p, w) by the upper hemi-continuity of Bν . Then, there
exists (c′ν , β′ν , γ′ν ) ∈ Bν (p, w) such that uν
(
c′ν , γ
′ν
sν
)
> uν
(
cν , γ
ν
sν
)
. Since Bν
is lower hemi-continuous, there exists a sequence
{(
c′kν , β′kν , γ′kν
)}
such that
for each
(
pk, wk
) ∈M+, (c′kν , β′kν , γ′kν) ∈ Bν (pk, wk) with (c′kν , β′kν , γ′kν)→
(c′ν , β′ν , γ′ν ) as
(
pk, wk
) → (p, w). Then, for (pk, wk) which is sufficiently
close to (p, w), uν
(
c′kν , γ
′kν
sν
)
> uν
(
ckν , γ
kν
sν
)
holds. However, since
(
ckν , βkν , γkν
) ∈
Oν (pk, wk), this is a contradiction. Thus, (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Oν (p, w), and so Oν
is upper hemi-continuous. ¥
Note that for any ν ∈ N , if (p, w) ∈M+ is associated with pα̂−wαl < 0 for
all α ∈ P\ {0}, then (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Oν (p, w) implies βν = 0. However, by A4,
for any p > 0, there is w′ > 0 such that for any w 5 w′, maxα∈P : pα=pω pα̂−
wαl is non-negative, so that there exists (c
ν , βν , γν )ν∈N ∈ ×ν∈NOν (p, w)
with
∑
ν∈N β
ν 6= 0.
For each (p, w) ∈M+, let P (p, w;ω) ≡
{
α ∈ argmaxα′∈P : pα5pω pα̂′ − wα′l
}
.
Suppose that for any α ∈ P (p, w;ω), αl >
∑
ν∈N s
ν . Then, there exists
α∗ ∈ P (p, w;ω) such that α∗ ∈ argmin {αl | α ∈ P (p, w;ω)}. Denote the set
of such α∗ by P (p, w;ω). Suppose that there exists α ∈ P (p, w;ω) such that
αl 5
∑
ν∈N s
ν . Then, define P (p, w;ω) ≡ {α ∈ P (p, w;ω) | αl 5∑ν∈N sν}.
Note that, for each (p, w) ∈M+, if P (p, w;ω) 6= ∅, then P (p, w;ω) = ∅. Fi-
nally, let P ∗(p, w;ω) ≡ P (p, w;ω)∪P (p, w;ω). By this definition, P ∗(p, w;ω)
is non-empty, closed, and compact.
For each (p, w) ∈M+, define the aggregate excess demand correspondence:
Z (p, w) ≡
{(∑
ν∈N
cν −
∑
ν∈N
β̂ν ,
∑
ν∈N
βνl −
∑
ν∈N
γν
)
|
∑
ν∈N
βν ∈ P ∗(p, w;ω)
& (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Oν (p, w) (∀ν ∈ N)} .
Given the above Lemmas and the definition of P ∗(p, w;ω), it follows that Z
is compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M+. To see
that it is non-empty, firstly suppose that (p, w) ∈M+ is such that pα̂−wαl < 0
for all α ∈ P\ {0}. Then, P (p, w;ω) = {0} = P (p, w;ω) = P ∗(p, w;ω). If
pα̂−wαl = 0 for some α ∈ P\ {0}, P (p, w;ω) ⊇ {α ∈ argmaxα′∈P : pα′=pω pα̂′ − wα′l}
holds by A1′, so that P ∗(p, w;ω) ∩ (P\ {0}) 6= ∅. In the former case,
P ∗(p, w;ω) = {0} holds, so that there exists (βν )ν∈N such that βν = 0 for
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all ν. In the latter case, if α ∈ P ∗(p, w;ω)\ {0}, then there exists (βν )ν∈N
such that
∑
ν∈N β
ν = α, and pβν = pων for all ν. Then, in either case, for
(cν , γν ) in Oν (p, w), it follows that (cν , βν , γν ) ∈ Oν (p, w) for each ν ∈ N .
By definition, since
∑
ν∈N β
ν ∈ P ∗(p, w;ω), Z (p, w) is non-empty. Then:
Lemma A1.3: There exists a price vector (p, w) ∈M+ such that 0 ∈ Z (p, w).
Proof: 1. First, we prove that Z satisfies the Strong Walras Law (SWL),
namely for each (p, w) ∈M+, and each (z1, z2) ∈ Z (p, w), pz1 + wz2 = 0. In
fact, for each (p, w) ∈M+, and each (z1, z2) ∈ Z (p, w),
pz1 + wz2 = p
(∑
ν∈N
cν −
∑
ν∈N
β̂ν
)
+ w
(∑
ν∈N
βνl −
∑
ν∈N
γν
)
=
∑
ν∈N
[
pcν −
{(
pβ̂ν − wβνl
)
+ wγν
}]
= 0,
since pcν =
(
pβ̂ν − wβνl
)
+ wγν for every ν, by the strict motonicity of uν .
2. Next, we prove that Z satisfies the following Boundary condition:
there is a (p˜, w˜) ∈M+ such that for every sequence
{(
pk, wk
)} ⊆M+ with(
pk, wk
) → (p, w) ∈M \ M+, there is an M such that for every k = M ,
(p˜, w˜) · (zk1 , zk2) > 0 holds for every (zk1 , zk2) ∈ Z (pk, wk). Take a sufficiently
small but positive real number ε, and define (p˜, w˜) ∈M+ as w˜ = ε > 0, and
for all j, p˜j =
1−ε
n
> 0. Then, consider any price vector (p, w) ∈M \ M+,
such that pi = 0 for one i. Firstly, note that because
{(
pk, wk
)} ⊆M+, it
is possible that wk = 0 for sufficiently large k. Thus, in this case, ckν = 0
for any ν ∈ W . However, in this case, the corresponding pimax k is strictly
positive by A4, and so Πν
(
pk, wk
)
> 0 for any ν ∈ O. Hence, by the strict
monotonicity of utility functions, ckν ≥ 0 for any ν ∈ O, and in particular,
ckνi is sufficiently large at p
k. Secondly,
{(
pk, wk
)} ⊆M+ may also contain
the case that wk > 0 but pimax k is zero for sufficiently large k. In this case,
because of the boundary condition for utility functions, any ν ∈W optimally
supplies a positive amount of labour, so that Πν
(
pk, wk
)
> 0. Thus, by
the strict monotonicity of utility functions, ckν ≥ 0 for any ν ∈ W , and in
particular, ckνi is sufficiently large at p
k. In sum, noting that βk ∈ P ∗(p, w;ω)
is bounded above, it follows that zk1i > 0 is sufficiently large for p
k sufficiently
close to p. Then, even if w˜ > 0, w˜zk2 will never compensate for p˜z
k
1 > 0, since
zk2 is bounded below by −
∑
ν∈N s
ν whereas p˜zk1 grows infinitely large due to
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a sufficiently large zk1i > 0. Thus, there is a neighbourhood N ((p, w) , δ) of
(p, w) such that (p˜, w˜) · (zk1 , zk2) > 0 for all (pk, wk) ∈ N ((p, w) , δ)∩ M+. A
similar argument holds if (p, w) ∈M \ M+, with pi = 0, for more than one i.
3. Set Km ≡ co
{
(q, w) ∈M+| dist ((q, w) ,M \ M+) = 1m
}
. Then, {Km} is
an increasing family of compact convex sets and M+= ∪mKm. Then, as in
Border (1985, Theorem 18.13, p. 85), it follows that there exists (p, w) ∈M+
and z ∈ Z (p, w) such that z 5 0. This fact together with (SWL) imply that
z = 0. In fact, since p > 0, (SWL) and z 5 0 imply that z1 = 0. Second, if
w > 0, then z2 = 0 holds by (SWL) and z 5 0. Thus, suppose w = 0 and
z2 ≡
∑
ν∈N β
∗ν
l −
∑
ν∈N γ
∗ν < 0. In this case, given that every agent’s utility
function uν is strictly monotonic on C, a corresponding real-valued function
V ν (Πν (p, w) , γν ) ≡ max(cν ,βν ,γν )∈Bν (p,w) uν (cν , γν ) is strictly monotonic on
Πν (p, w), for all ν.
Since Πν (p, w) = pimaxpβ∗ν+wγ∗ν = pimaxpβ∗ν , then V ν (Πν (p, w) , γ∗ν ) =
V ν (Πν (p, w) , 0) because uν is (weakly) decreasing in γν on [0, 1]. Thus,
whenever (c∗ν , β∗ν , γ∗ν ) ∈ Oν (p, w) for all ν ∈ N , then for any γ∗∗ν ∈ [0, γ∗ν ],
we have (c∗ν , β∗ν , γ∗∗ν ) ∈ Oν (p, w), which implies that, for any (γ∗∗ν )ν∈N ∈
×ν∈N [0, γ∗ν ] with
∑
ν∈N γ
∗∗ν =
∑
ν∈N β
∗ν
l , (c
∗ν , β∗ν , γ∗∗ν ) ∈ Oν (p, w) holds
for any ν ∈ N . Let z′2 ≡
∑
ν∈N β
∗ν
l −
∑
ν∈N γ
∗∗ν = 0. Then, (z1, z′2) ∈
Z (p, w), which yields the desired result. ¥
Lemma A1.3 proves the existence of a fixed point for the aggregate ex-
cess demand correspondences, and therefore the existence of a price vector
(p, w) ∈M+ such that conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) of Definition 1 are satis-
fied. In order to complete the proof of existence of a RS, it is necessary
to show that condition (iii) also holds. Theorem A1.1 provides a condition
on aggregate social endowments under which the capital constraint (iii) is
satisfied.
Theorem A1.1: Let A1′˜A3 hold and let uν be continuous, quasi-concave,
strictly increasing on C , and satisfying the boundary condition for all ν ∈ N .
Then, for any given profile Ω = (ων )ν∈N with
∑
ν∈N ω
ν = ω ≥ 0 which
satisfies A4, there exists a distribution Ω′ = (ω′ν )ν∈N with
∑
ν∈N ω
′ν = ω′
and a RS (p, w) ∈M+ for the economy E(P,N,u, s,Ω′) with pω′ = pω.
Proof: Let P,N, s, and Ω = (ων )ν∈N satisfy A1
′˜A4, and let u be
such that for all ν ∈ N , uν is continuous, quasi-concave, strictly increas-
ing on C , and it satisfies the boundary condition. Then, we can ap-
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ply Lemmas A1.1-A1.3, to prove that there exists (p∗, w∗) ∈M+ such that(∑
ν∈N c
∗ν −∑ν∈N β̂∗ν) = 0 and (∑ν∈N β∗νl −∑ν∈N γ∗ν) = 0.
Thus, (p∗, w∗) is associated with p∗α̂ − w∗αl = 0 for some α ∈ P\ {0}.
In fact, if (p∗, w∗) is such that p∗α̂ − w∗αl < 0 for all α ∈ P\ {0}, then
β∗ν = 0 for all ν ∈ N , but γ∗ν > 0 and c∗ν 6= 0 follow from w∗ > 0 and
the boundary condition for utility functions. (Note that if p∗α̂ − w∗αl < 0
for all α ∈ P\ {0}, then w∗ > 0.) Hence,
(∑
ν∈N c
∗ν −∑ν∈N β̂∗ν) ≥ 0 and(∑
ν∈N β
∗ν
l −
∑
ν∈N γ
∗ν) < 0 follow if p∗α̂ − w∗αl < 0 for all α ∈ P\ {0},
which is a contradiction. Thus, p∗α̂− w∗αl = 0 for some α ∈ P\ {0}.
Note that, since p∗α̂−w∗αl = 0 for some α ∈ P\ {0}, (0, β∗ν , γ∗ν , c∗ν )ν∈N
is a profile of optimal solutions of all MP ν with p∗β∗ν = p∗ων for all ν ∈
N , thus p∗β∗ = p∗ω at (p∗, w∗). By A4, the existence of such a profile is
guaranteed.
Let us define Ω′ = (ω′ν )ν∈N as ω
′ν = β∗ν for each ν ∈ N . Then, since
p∗ω′ν = p∗ων holds for each ν ∈ N , it follows that (0, β∗ν , γ∗ν , c∗ν )ν∈N re-
mains a profile of optimal solutions of allMP ν such that
(∑
ν∈N c
∗ν −∑ν∈N β̂∗ν) =
0 and
(∑
ν∈N β
∗ν
l −
∑
ν∈N γ
∗ν) = 0. Moreover β∗ = ω, and therefore condi-
tion (iii) of Definition 1 is also satisfied. Hence, for the economy E(P,N,u, s,Ω′),
(p∗, w∗) is a RS with associated profile (0, β∗ν , γ∗ν , c∗ν )ν∈N . ¥
8 Appendix 2: Definitions 2 and 3
Lemma A2.1: There exists an economy E ∈ E and a RS (p, w) with as-
sociated aggregate production point αp,w such that neither Definition 2 nor
Definition 3 satisfy condition (2) of Theorem 1.
Proof: Consider the following von Neumann technology:
B =
[
2 3 0
1 4.5 5.25
]
, A =
[
1 2 0
1 3 3.5
]
, L =
(
1 1 1
)
,
where A is the input matrix; B is the output matrix; and L is the vector of
labour coefficients. Define the production possibility set P(A,B,L) by
P(A,B,L) ≡
{
α ∈ R− × R2− × R2+ | ∃x ∈ R3+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
}
.
P(A,B,L) is a closed convex cone in R− × Rm− × Rm+ with 0 ∈ P(A,B,L) and it
satisfies A1∼A3. Let ej ∈ Rm+ be a unit column vector with 1 in the j-th
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component and 0 in any other component. Let α1 ≡ (−Le1,−Ae1, Be1),
α2 ≡ (−Le2,−Ae2, Be2), and α3 ≡ (−Le3,−Ae3, Be3). Then,
α̂1 ≡ (B − A) e1 =
(
1
0
)
, α̂2 ≡ (B − A) e2 =
(
1
1.5
)
,
α̂3 ≡ (B − A) e3 =
(
0
1.75
)
.
Also, we have P̂ (αl = 1) = co {(1, 0) , (1, 1.5) , (0, 1.75) ,0}.
Let W 6= ∅ and let N be such that |N | > |W |. Let c∗ = (1, 1) and
let the social endowment of capital be given by ω = (2 |N | , 3 |N |). Let
u ≡ (u, . . . , u) with u (c, λ) ≡ c1 + c2, and s ≡ (1, . . . , 1). Finally, let ων =(
2|N |
|N |−|W | ,
3|N |
|N |−|W |
)
for all ν ∈ N\W , so that ∑ν∈N ων = ω. This completely
defines the economy E
(
N,P(A,B,L),u, s,Ω
)
. Then, a pair (p, 1) with p =
(0.5, 0.5) constitutes a RS for E
(
N,P(A,B,L),u, s,Ω
)
associated with a social
production point |N |α2. To see this, note first that
[p (B − A)− L] e1
pAe1
= −1
2
;
[p (B − A)− L] e2
pAe2
=
1
10
;
[p (B − A)− L] e3
pAe3
= − 1
14
.
Thus, for all ν ∈ N\W , βν = |N ||N |−|W |α2, cν =
(
1, 1.5|N |−|W ||N |−|W |
)
, and λν = 1
is an optimal solution to MP ν . Further, for every ν ∈ W , (cν , λν ) = (c∗, 1)
is an optimal solution to MP ν , so that at this RS, W+ = W . Then, it is
immediate to check that conditions (ii)-(iv) of Definition 1 are all satisfied.
Since cν = c∗, then in both Definition 2 and Definition 3, cν = c∗ and
α̂c
ν
= c∗ hold for every ν ∈ W . Then it is immediate to show that for all
ν ∈ W , there exists no cν ∈ Γ (p, w; Λν)∪
{
Λν
αp,wl
α̂p,w
}
such that cν > (1, 1) =
α̂c
ν
even though pimax = 1
10
> 0, which implies that in this economy, neither
Definition 2 nor Definition 3 satisfy condition (2) of Theorem 1.¥16
16The constructed economy in this proof does not satisfy ‘independence of production,’
which was introduced by Roemer (1981; Ch2) as the necessary and sufficient condition for
preserving FMT under Definition 2 in convex cone economies with homogeneous agents.
Note, however, that in convex cone economies with heterogeneous agents, independence
of production is no longer necessary nor sufficient, since it is easy to find an economy
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and a RS with heterogenous consumption bundles (cν )ν∈W among propertyless workers,
in which the production set satisfies independence of production while condition (2) of
Theorem 1 does not hold for some propertyless worker.
In contrast, FMT does not hold in general under Definition 3 even if the production set
satisfies independence of production and the economy has homogeneous agents. This can
be seen by checking Figure 2 in Yoshihara (2010; footnote 13).
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